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Introduction
Deleuze and Post-Kantian Thought: 
Method, Ideas and Aesthetics
Without doubt, Immanuel Kant’s transcendental idealism constituted a 
major event in philosophy – one that continues to be actualised in mul-
tifarious ways today. It has provided the terms of reference and inspira-
tion for several philosophical traditions, most notably German Idealism 
and Romanticism, but also various currents across the spectrum of 
contemporary philosophy.1 In the work of Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s pres-
ence is pronounced. Despite Deleuze’s famous remark that his book on 
Kant’s critical philosophy was intended ‘as a book about an enemy’,2 
this proclaimed hostility towards Kant rather proves that he regarded 
Kant as an important ‘intercessor’3 whose concepts could be made to 
work in a new problematic setting. In fact, Deleuze expresses a kind 
of involuntary admiration for Kant: ‘there functions a sort of thinking 
machine, a sort of creation of concepts that is absolutely frightening’.4 
And in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze compares Kant to ‘a great 
explorer’ since he is ‘the one who discovers the prodigious domain of the 
transcendental’.5 Kant’s transcendental philosophy meant turning away 
from metaphysical projects of grounding philosophy on transcendent 
principles and values; it replaces the concept of essence with the concept 
of sense or appearance and the search for the conditions of appearances; 
 1 Indeed, for those who find value in the so-called ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ divide, 
it is not uncommon for Kant to be identified as the branching point of these two 
trajectories (bearing in mind, of course, that this divergence is retrospectively 
fabricated).
 2 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1995), p. 6.
 3 Ibid. p. 125.
 4 Gilles Deleuze, ‘Synthesis and Time’, Lecture Course on Kant held at Vincennes, 14 
March 1978, available at <www.webdeleuze.com>
 5 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994), p. 135.
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it introduces time as a structure of empirical consciousness. For Deleuze, 
the ‘greatest initiative of transcendental philosophy’ is the introduction 
of difference in the ‘I’: the subject is fractured in the transcendental 
‘I’ that thinks, and thereby generates its own empirical passive self in 
the form of time.6 In this regard, Deleuze claims that Hölderlin, rather 
than Fichte or Hegel, is the true descendant to Kant,7 because he poses 
the problem of the pure and empty form of time on the level of Greek 
tragedy, showing its shattering effect in Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex. On 
Deleuze’s reading, Oedipus is guilty of committing a crime – specifically, 
the excessive act of separating himself from the gods and doing away 
with divine judgement – and is therefore compelled to err along the 
straight line of pure and empty time.8
Remarks like these on Kant’s descendants (such as Maimon, Fichte, 
Hölderlin, Schelling and Hegel) occur throughout Deleuze’s corpus; 
and yet, a close assessment of these connections remains missing. Thus, 
while Deleuze’s debt to Kant is clear and well acknowledged, a great 
deal remains to be said on both the manner of his relations to many 
post-Kantian thinkers and indeed the post-Kantian tenor of his own 
thought.
An exception is perhaps Deleuze’s relationship to Hegel, which has 
received much attention of late in Deleuze scholarship. Generally, 
Deleuze is seen as an anti-Hegelian thinker9 – an impression solidi-
fied by his book on Nietzsche, which is unambiguously written with 
an anti-Hegelian edge. As is often remarked, Deleuze criticises Hegel’s 
dialectic for its appeal to concepts of negation: ontological difference 
is misrepresented as contradiction, leading to a ‘negation of negation’ 
that precludes any affirmation of difference.10 Hegel is thus regarded as 
having betrayed the philosophy of difference – a result that is rectified in 
Nietzsche. However, a more favourable reading of Hegel can be found 
in Deleuze’s 1954 review of Jean Hyppolite’s book Logic and Existence. 
There, Deleuze affirms Hyppolite’s interpretation of Hegelian dialectis 
 6 Ibid. p. 87.
 7 Ibid. pp. 58 and 87.
 8 Deleuze, ‘Synthesis and Time’. See also Gregory Flaxman, ‘Chronos is Sick: Deleuze, 
Antonioni and the Kantian Lineage of Modern Cinema’, in this volume, pp. ???
 9 Cf. Deleuze’s distaste for Hegel is clearly expressed in his ‘Letter to a Harsh Critic’: 
What I most detested was Hegelianism and dialectics’, in Negotiations, p. 6. However, 
in spite of this frequently cited enmity, recent scholarship also highlights the thematic 
connections and points of convergence between Deleuze and Hegel. See Nathan 
Widder, ‘State Philosophy and the War Machine’, in this volume, pp. ???
10 Cf. Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 196.
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as an ontology of sense, which is to say, an ontology of expression: 
‘Philosophy must be ontology, it cannot be anything else; but there is 
no ontology of essence, there is only an ontology of sense.’11 The main 
claim of the book, according to Deleuze, is that philosophy has to rid 
itself of anthropology. Thus Hegel criticised the Kantian conception of 
reality, which remains tied to subjective representational experience or 
self-consciousness. Kantian concepts are extrinsic to the thing-in-itself, 
Hegel says, and ‘no fit terms to express the Absolute’.12 For Hegel, 
there is nothing outside the concept: it fully expresses the dialectical 
development of the Absolute, consisting in the stages of unity, difference 
and unity-in-difference. In Hyppolite’s words, it expresses the sense or 
meaning of the Absolute. While Deleuze endorses Hyppolite’s account 
of Hegel’s dialectics as a model of immanent self-differentiation, where 
the concept is revealed as the expression of the Absolute, he nonethe-
less asks ‘whether an ontology of difference couldn’t be created that 
would not go all the way to contradiction, since contradiction would 
be less and not more than difference’.13 This remark already anticipates 
Deleuze’s own elaboration of a philosophy of difference as well as his 
own logic of sense.
Deleuze’s engagement with post-Kantian philosophy owes much to 
his teachers: besides his lecturer Jean Hyppolite, this is most notably 
Martial Guéroult. Olivier Revault, a longtime friend of Deleuze during 
his time as a Sorbonne student, reports that they admired Martial 
Guéroult for his close readings and structural method: ‘I always found 
Gilles to be a great student of Guéroult.’14 In fact, explicit traces of 
Guéroult can be found in the footnotes of many of Deleuze’s books. 
When discussing the work of Maimon or Fichte, Deleuze usually 
refers to Gueroult’s book La Philosophie transcendantale de Salomon 
Maïmon (1929) or the two volumes of L’Évolution et la structure 
de la doctrine de la science chez Fichte (1930). It seems likely that 
Deleuze knew Maimon and Fichte first and foremost through reading 
Guéroult. Of course, the most obvious homage to Guéroult is Deleuze’s 
1969 article ‘Gueroult’s General Method for Spinoza’, which was 
11 Gilles Deleuze, ‘Jean Hyppolite’s Logic of Existence’, in David Lapoujade (ed.), 
Desert Islands and Other Texts (1953–74), trans. Michael Taormina (New York: 
Semiotext(e), 2004), p. 15.
12 G. W. F. Hegel, Encyclopedia Logic, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1975 [1830]), §44, p. 72.
13 Deleuze, ‘Jean Hyppolite’s Logic of Existence’, p. 18.
14 Cited in François Dosse, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2010), p. 97.
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 published only one year after Guéroult’s extensive study of part I of the 
Ethics.15
So far, we have traced the autobiographical encounters by which 
certain ideas of German idealism – of Maimon, Fichte and Hegel – 
influenced Deleuze’s philosophy. Beyond that, the aim of this volume 
is to show the common themes and concepts that Deleuze shares with 
post-Kantian thought. Deleuze is certainly not a post-Kantian thinker 
in the manner of German Idealism and Romanticism. Nevertheless, as 
Christian Kerslake has argued, many of his ‘questions and problems 
emerge from within the post-Kantian tradition of philosophy’.16 Indeed, 
Kerslake goes so far as to claim that ‘Deleuze’s own conception of his 
philosophical project is fundamentally post-Kantian in its assumptions’ 
– a strong thesis that he justifies primarily with regard to Deleuze’s 
1956–7 lecture series Qu’est-ce que fonder?.17 This early lecture course 
is the most coherent and explicit engagement of Deleuze with the post-
Kantian tradition and, as Kerslake claims, it already sets the course for 
Deleuze’s attempt ‘to transform Kantianism from within, and to produce 
a self-grounding post-Kantian system of complete self-differentiation’.18 
Kerslake interprets Deleuze’s philosophy as a continuation of the 
Kantian project, as carrying out a ‘Copernican revolution which opens 
up the possibility of difference having its own concept’.19 But while 
Kerslake’s careful and detailed argumentation has a lot to commend it, 
it is debatable whether Deleuze’s philosophical thinking can be systema-
tised to the extent that Kerslake suggests. The aim of this book is com-
parably modest: as a collection, the contributions seek to identify some 
significant common problems and interests that link Deleuze in various 
ways to the diverse tradition of post-Kantian thought.20 As way of intro-
duction, we will discuss a few themes that seem to entail eminent points 
of resonance between Deleuze’s thought and post-Kantian philosophy: 
15 Martial Guéroult, Spinoza/1, Dieu (Ethique, I) (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1968); 
Gilles Deleuze, ‘Gueroult’s General Method for Spinoza’, in David Lapoujade (ed.), 
Desert Islands and Other Texts (1953–74), trans. Michael Taormina (New York: 
Semiotext(e), 2004), pp. 146–155.
16 Christian Kerslake, Immanence and the Vertigo of Philosophy: From Kant to Deleuze 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), p. 3.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid. p. 26.
19 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 40–1.
20 Perhaps, Joe Hughes’ contribution to this collection ‘Ground, Transcendence and 
Method in Deleuze’s Fichte’ comes closest to Kerslake’s suggestion, as the common 
problem that he identifies for both Deleuze and Fichte is ‘the completion of the 
Kantian enterprise’. See this volume, p. ???
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(1) the notion of a synthetic and constructive method; (2) the Idea or the 
Absolute; and (3) Aesthetics.
THE NOTION OF A SYNTHETIC AND CONSTRUCTIVE METHOD
The German Idealists were disappointed by Kant’s attempt to ground 
experience and knowledge in the a priori mental structure of the tran-
scendental subject. Kant presupposed a priori facts about cognition, 
i.e. forms and categories that were supposed to secure an objective 
standard of knowledge, but the German Idealists found his justifica-
tion wanting. Kant’s transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of 
the understanding is built on formal logic; it takes as its inspiration the 
Aristotelian table of logical forms of judgement and proceeds by formal 
logical inference. However, convinced by Jacobi, the German Idealists 
doubted that general logic is an adequate model for philosophy, since it 
is entirely formal and completely abstracts from all relation to empiri-
cal reality. Maimon was the first to ask: ‘how is it conceivable that a 
priori concepts of the understanding like those of cause and effect can 
provide determinations of something a posteriori?’21 The underlying 
problem is the fundamental distinction between formal logic and the 
real. In fact, it was Kant’s great achievement to have rejected traditional 
metaphysics by insisting on the distinction between ‘logical’ relations 
and ‘real’ relations. In the ‘Remark to the amphiboly of the concepts 
of reflection’, Kant accuses Leibniz of misrepresenting the real relations 
of space and time: Leibniz draws these representations into the concept 
and thus reduces them to merely logical and intelligible relations of 
things.22 However, in the wake of this distinction, Kant had to struggle 
with the hiatus between logical concepts and real relations. A possible 
solution to this predicament was sketched out by certain post-Kantian 
philosophers: ‘Should not transcendental logic be deduced from its prin-
ciple independently of general logic?’23 Maimon, Hölderlin, Novalis, 
Schlegel, Schelling and Hegel, each in his own way, were searching for a 
more compelling derivation or sufficient reason which would provide a 
21 Salomon Maimon, Essay on Transcendental Philosophy, trans. Nick Midgley, Henry 
Somers-Hall, Alistair Welchman and Merten Reglitz (London, New York: Continuum, 
2010 [1790]), p. 41.
22 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), A275–26/B331–2.
23 Paul Franks, ‘Serpentine Naturalism and Protean Nihilism: Transcendental Philosophy 
in Anthropological Post-Kantianism, German Idealism, and Neo-Kantianism’, in 
Brian Leiter and Michael Rosen (eds), Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 258.
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basis for the real relations of space and time, no less than for the matter 
of experience itself. What was needed was a foundation for empiri-
cal reality as a whole. Ironically, the German Idealists returned to the 
pre-Kantian metaphysicians, and in particular to Spinoza, in order to 
improve on Kantian transcendental philosophy.24
As Spinoza has argued, ‘the true method of discovery is to form 
thoughts from some given definitions’.25 However, a complete or perfect 
definition must satisfy some requirements: it should not simply postulate 
the existence of the thing with all its properties. On the contrary, it must 
be possible to deduce the innermost essence of the thing including all its 
properties from the definition. As an example for an incomplete defini-
tion of a thing, Spinoza takes the nominal definition of a circle:
If a circle is defined as a figure, such that all straight lines drawn from the 
centre to the circumference are equal, every one can see that such a defini-
tion does not in the least explain the essence of a circle, but solely one of 
its properties.26
Instead, a definition is required which provides an explanation for the 
production of the figure – that is, a real definition explaining how it 
arises. In the case of the circle it can be a dynamic rule of construction, 
such as ‘the figure described by any line whereof one end is fixed and the 
other free’.27 Salomon Maimon discusses the example of the definition 
of the circle in his Essay on Transcendental Philosophy and similarly 
comes to the conclusion that a nominal definition is insufficient, because 
we would only ‘know the meaning of the rule or condition of the circle’ 
but not its mode of genesis. As Maimon says: ‘Should it be incapable 
of fulfilment, then the concept here expressed in words would have no 
objective reality: its synthesis would be found only in words but not 
in the thing itself.’28 He therefore demands a ‘real definition’, which 
supplies an explanation of the way that things arise, i.e. a method of 
generation that also provides the basis for the ‘material completeness’ 
of the thing. In analogy to the geometrical method by means of which 
synthetic concepts can be constructed, philosophy needs to find a genetic 
and synthetic method to explain the genesis of objects.
24 Ibid. p. 256.
25 Benedict de Spinoza, On the Improvement of the Understanding, in Spinoza, On the 
Improvement of the Understanding, The Ethics & Correspondence, trans. R. H. M. 
Elwes (New York: Dover, 1955), §94, pp. 34–5.
26 Ibid. §95, p. 35.
27 Ibid. §96, p. 35.
28 Maimon, Essay on Transcendental Philosophy, p. 50.
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While this is not the place to engage in a full discussion of Maimon’s 
solution to the problem of the genesis of things, we can nevertheless see 
the way in which geometry and its method of construction of concepts 
served as an inspiration for philosophy. This sympathy for the geomet-
ric method is largely due to Spinoza, which he had rendered reputable 
through the application of the more geometrico in his Ethics.
As Martial Guéroult argued, Spinoza’s use of definitions, propositions 
and demonstrations by no means follows a formal logic of inference. 
Spinoza does not begin with a self-evident principle from which all other 
beliefs are derived in a chain of deduction. Instead, Spinoza arrives at 
the definition of a single substance or God within the first eight proposi-
tions of the Ethics: in the beginning, he defines the attributes as qualified 
substances, which are distinct in reality but not numerically distinct. 
Together they constitute one and the same substance. In Guéroult’s 
words: ‘God is motley, but unfragmentable, constituted of heterogeneous 
but inseparable attributes.’29 According to this interpretation, the attrib-
utes are genealogical elements of substance whose definition is derived 
by means of a genetic and synthetic method. Thus, Spinoza’s geometric 
method is essentially synthetic – and therefore resembles the geomet-
ric method in mathematical constructions. In his article on Guéroult, 
Deleuze emphasises that Spinozism as a ‘genetic and constructive phi-
losophy is inseparable from a synthetic method’.30 In the same article 
he also praises Guéroult for having demonstrated a ‘deep Spinozism of 
Fichte’: Fichte also pursued a synthetic method, ‘which is opposed to 
Kant’s analytic method’.31 In his Lecture course Qu’est-ce que fonder?, 
Deleuze explains that the Kantian transcendental project is based on facts 
of consciousness, or at least makes use of a hypothesis: if we have objec-
tive experience, then the categories must be objectively valid.
In the Kantian attempt a simple hypothesis subsists. Kant remains tied to 
simple facticity, Fichte says, while he, Fichte, seeks genesis. . . . Therefore 
Fichte claims ‘Kant has never elevated himself to the transcendental analy-
sis. His analysis is only regressive.’32
Fichte took issue with the Kantian presupposition of the transcen-
dental ‘I’. It seemed not acceptable that the unconditioned ground of 
29 Guéroult, Spinoza, pp. 234, 447. Cited in Deleuze, ‘Gueroult’s General Method for 
Spinoza’, p. 150.
30 Deleuze, ‘Gueroult’s General Method for Spinoza’, p. 151.
31 Ibid. p. 147.
32 Deleuze, Qu’est-ce que fonder?, trans. Daniela Voss. The lecture series is available at 
<www.webdeleuze.com>
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 experience and of all objects of experience was an unknowable self, and 
that this unknowable self was at the same time the necessary condition 
to render free action possible. Fichte demanded access to the uncon-
ditioned, self-grounding subject and developed a theory of intellectual 
intuition resorting to the theory of mathematical construction. ‘Just as 
we prove a proposition in geometry through the construction of a figure 
in pure intuition, so in philosophy we should demonstrate the forms of 
the mind by constructing them in a pure intuition.’33
Ironically, Kant himself had written on the method of construction 
in the first chapter of ‘The Transcendental Doctrine of Method’, but he 
explicitly relegated this method of cognition to the field of mathematics 
and argued against any attempt to draw metaphysical conclusions by 
mathematical constructions.
Mathematics is thoroughly grounded on definitions, axioms and demon-
strations. I will content myself with showing that none of these elements, 
in the sense in which the mathematician takes them, can be achieved or 
imitated by philosophy; and that by means of his method the geometrician 
[Meßkünstler] can build nothing in philosophy except houses of cards . . . 
[P]hilosophy consists precisely in knowing its bounds.34
The main distinction between mathematics and philosophy, Kant argues, 
lies in two different uses of reason: The philosophical use ‘is called the 
use of reason in accordance with concepts’.35 It can provide nothing but 
a rule of synthesis, a pure concept, under which possible empirical intui-
tions can be subsumed. Thus it only amounts to discursive knowledge 
achieved by mere concepts. The mathematical use of reason ‘is the use of 
reason through construction of concepts’:36 it allows the construction of 
synthetic concepts in pure intuition – that is, the pure objects themselves 
as spatio-temporal magnitudes (quanta). According to Kant, there is a 
great difference ‘between the discursive use of reason in accordance with 
concepts and its intuitive use through the construction of concepts’.37 
However, the German Idealists did not seem to be convinced.
In his essay ‘Über die Construktion in der Philosophie’, Schelling 
argues that the Kantian distinction between philosophy and mathemat-
33 Frederick Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism, 1781–1801 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 296. See also Frederick Amrine, 
‘“The magic formula we all seek”: Spinoza + Fichte = x’, in this volume, p. ???
34 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A726–7/B754–5 (translation modified by Daniela 
Voss).
35 Ibid. A723/B751.
36 Ibid. A724/B752.
37 Ibid. A719/B747.
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ics cannot be upheld.38 On the contrary, the geometrical method is sup-
posed to be analogous to the method in philosophy. The mathematician, 
in constructing a geometrical figure, realises the universal within the 
particular, the ideal within the real, just as the philosopher’s task is to 
abstract from the contingent features of the particular and see it as an 
instantiation of the Absolute. The only difference lies in the nature of the 
universal: in geometry, the universal is the pure forms of intuition (space 
and time), while philosophy is concerned with the universe as a whole, 
i.e. the Absolute. In order to grasp the Absolute, the philosopher has to 
resort to ‘intellectual intuition’, which is a means to construct the iden-
tity of all things as archetypes or manifestations of the absolute princi-
ple. For Schelling, the mathematical method of construction played a 
vital role in his late Jena philosophy of intellectual intuition.39 No doubt, 
Kant would have insisted that Schelling regresses to pre-Kantian meta-
physics, that he has given up reflective thinking and affirmed speculative 
thought. Indeed, ‘as speculative philosophy, German Idealism speaks 
ontologically once more: it considers “what everything is in itself”’.40
We have already referred to Deleuze’s approval of the synthetic and 
constructive method and he explicitly praises it as an achievement of the 
post-Kantians. In his lecture course Qu’est-ce que fonder?, he declares 
that the common theme of Maimon and Fichte is the substitution of 
a synthetic and genetic method for the Kantian discursive method of 
gaining knowledge from mere concepts. Even Hegel understands the dia-
lectic as a synthetic and genetic method – in fact, as an ontological, dia-
lectical movement of the things themselves.41 In what way does Deleuze 
take up this synthetic and genetic method in his own philosophy?
In a paper given to the members of the French Society of Philosophy 
on 28 January 1967, Deleuze explains his conception of ‘the method 
of dramatization’.42 With this method Deleuze picks up on the Kantian 
theory of schematisation, which is supposed to settle the difficulties of 
mediation between concepts and intuition, and sketches a solution in his 
own way: he ‘dramatizes’ the schema and renders it dynamical. What he 
has in mind is something akin to Maimon’s ‘ideas of the understanding’ 
38 F. W. J. Schelling, ‘Über die Construktion in der Philosophie’, in H. M. Baumgartner, 
W. G. Jacobs, H. Krings and H. Zeltner (eds), Werke: Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe 
(Stuttgart–Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1976–), vol. V, pp. 125–34.
39 Cf. Beiser, German Idealism, p. 585–8.
40 Franks, ‘Serpentine Naturalism and Protean Nihilism’, p. 268.
41 Cf. Deleuze, Qu’est-ce que fonder?, available at <www.webdeleuze.com>
42 Gilles Deleuze, ‘The Method of Dramatization’, in David Lapoujade (ed.), Desert 
Islands and Other Texts (1953–74), trans. Michael Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 
2004), pp. 94–116.
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or ‘differentials’ – i.e. non-representional, intensive elements that gener-
ate spatio-temporal intuition through reciprocal determination.
In a certain way, all the post-Kantians have tried to elucidate the mystery 
of this hidden art [schematisation], according to which dynamic spatio-
temporal determinations genuinely have the power to dramatize a concept, 
although they have a nature totally different from the concept.43
Spatio-temporal dynamisms, according to Deleuze, create particular 
spaces and times; they generate both the quantitative and qualitative 
nature of things44 as well as their generic and specific characteristics (e.g. 
the way that an animal inhabits its territory, organises space). Spatio-
temporal dynamisms also specify concepts, but not in the Kantian sense 
of synthesising possible sensations under empty logical forms; rather, the 
concepts themselves are generated. In other words, concepts don’t pre-
exist, they are not dependent on mental structures, nor are the concepts 
derived from logical forms of judgement. Rather, concepts are generated 
in practical encounters, in real experience.45 More precisely, the genesis 
of the act of thinking has its sufficient cause in an intensive reality that 
impinges on the sensible and nervous system of the body. This is what 
Deleuze calls ‘a strange theatre’ that affects the body and soul of ‘larval 
subjects’ (alluding to Antonin Artaud’s theatre of cruelty46). What it also 
shows is that spatio-temporal dynamisms are not completely without 
a relation to subjectivity. As is generally known, Deleuze – just like 
Hölderlin, Novalis, Schlegel, Schelling and Hegel – completely abandons 
the Cartesian conception of self-consciousness, or the autonomous and 
self-sufficient Kantian–Fichtean subject as the starting point of philoso-
phy. For the German Idealists, the subject still has an important role to 
play as the highest manifestation of the Absolute, the implicit telos of 
its self-differentiation. For Deleuze, however, the subject is not inherent 
as a telos, it is a real thing, a ‘larval subject’ that is open to processes of 
individuation and metamorphoses.
43 Ibid. p. 99.
44 As an example, Deleuze refers to the ‘dynamics of the egg’, i.e. the ‘cellular migra-
tions, foldings, invaginations, stretchings’ that constitute a field of individuation for 
the embryo. A possible example of spatio-temporal dynamisms concerning inorganic 
nature could be the foldings and stretchings of barrier reefs or, as Deleuze says, ‘the 
geographical dynamism of the island (island as rupture with the continent, and island as 
an eruption from the deep)’. Deleuze, ‘The Method of Dramatization’, pp. 96 and 98.
45 For instance, the concept of truth gains its material signification through dramatic 
dynamisms that specify ‘who wants the true, when and where, how and how much?’ 
Cf. Deleuze, ‘The Method of Dramatization’, p. 98.
46 Ibid. p. 98. See also Henry Somers-Hall, ‘Feuerbach and the Image of Thought’, in this 
volume p. ???
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What Deleuze presents in his paper on ‘The Method of Dramatization’ 
is a model of genesis and differentiation that in many ways is constructed 
along the lines of post-Kantian ideas. He accepts the post-Kantian cri-
tique that ‘Kant held fast to the point of view of conditioning without 
attaining that of genesis.’47 His own model therefore accounts for the 
genesis of objects and subjects, thought and concepts, and presupposes 
as sufficient reason or transcendental condition a field of intensive dif-
ferences, ‘an intensive spatium that preexists every quality and every 
extension’.48 In Deleuze’s system, this intensive field is the ‘virtual Idea’ 
and the function of spatio-temporal dynamisms is to ‘dramatize’ or 
actualise the Idea.
The answer perhaps lies in a direction that certain post-Kantians have 
indicated: pure spatio-temporal dynamisms have the power to dramatize 
concepts, because first they actualize incarnate Ideas.49
THE IDEA OR THE ABSOLUTE
German Idealism, in spite of its variety and diverse tradition, can be 
regarded as a philosophy of the Absolute or the Idea, which must be 
interpreted as something unconditioned, infinite and impersonal. The 
German Idealists thought of it as a sufficient reason or self-grounding 
principle. They thereby followed their ‘mentor’ Spinoza who defined 
substance as ‘that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself’ and 
argued that from ‘the idea of God . . . an infinite number of things follow 
in infinite ways’.50
Schelling often refers to his philosophy as ‘the doctrine of ideas’ 
(Ideenlehre), and in his 1804 System der gesammten Philosophie 
describes the Absolute as something which is ‘from itself and through 
itself’ (von sich selbst und durch sich selbst).51 Hegel held that all finite 
things exist in the ‘universal divine idea’, just as Spinoza argued that 
‘modes . . . can neither be, nor be conceived without substance; where-
fore they can only be in the divine nature, and can only through it be 
47 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 170.
48 Deleuze, ‘The Method of Dramatization’, p. 97.
49 Ibid. p. 99.
50 Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, in Spinoza, On the Improvement of the Understanding, 
The Ethics & Correspondence, trans. R. H. M. Elwes (New York: Dover, 1955), Book 
I, def. 3, p. 45 and Book II, prop. 4, p. 85. 
51 F. W. J. Schelling, Sämtliche Werke, ed. K. F. A. Schelling, 14 vols (Stuttgart: Cotta, 
1856–61), vol. VI, p. 148, §7.
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conceived’.52 Of course, in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 
Hegel criticised Spinoza’s system, arguing that the modes are only affec-
tions without reality and that they completely disappear in the substance. 
Spinozism, according to Hegel, is ‘acosmic’ insofar as ‘all this that we 
know as the world has been cast into the abyss of the one identity. There 
is therefore no such thing as finite reality.’53 Although Hegel never men-
tions Maimon in this context, it seems that he fully adopted Maimon’s 
view, who had first characterised Spinoza’s system as an ‘acosmism’ in 
his autobiography. There, Maimon says that Spinoza denies the reality 
of the world of multiple diverse and finite things: ‘In this system unity is 
real, but multiplicity is merely ideal.’54 Whatever the correct interpreta-
tion of Spinoza (certainly, Deleuze would disagree emphatically), it is 
important to note that for Maimon and Hegel, as well as for Schelling 
or the early Romantics (Hölderlin, Novalis, Schlegel), the ideal is real. In 
other words, idealism and realism are not understood as oppositions.55 
In a similar vein, Deleuze defines the nature of virtual Ideas as real, bor-
rowing a formulation of Proust: Ideas are ‘real without being actual, 
ideal without being abstract’.56 For Deleuze, the virtual Idea possesses 
a full intensive reality, consisting of differential elements and relations, 
singularities and poles. It does not merely have a regulative function 
like Kantian ideas, but acts as a sufficient reason: it is ‘the reason of 
the sensible, the condition of that which appears’.57 Virtual Ideas are 
also the indispensible conditions for the generation of thought: they are 
problems or problematic structures that need to be actualised in a cor-
responding field, be it a mathematical theory, a physical or biological 
system, the social field or an artwork. Deleuze’s dialectic of Ideas is not 
connected with any particular example, but articulates the virtual matrix 
of any actual system or structure. According to Deleuze, virtual reality is 
not something transcendent, but rather a transcendental field, a genetic 
condition which generates the actual but does not resemble it. In his late 
text ‘Immanence: A Life’, Deleuze again talks of the transcendental field 
and defines it as a plane of immanence: ‘The transcendental field then 
52 Spinoza, Ethics, Book I, prop. 15, demonstration.
53 G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Medieval and Modern 
Philosophy, Part III, trans. E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1995), p. 281.
54 Salomon Maimon, Solomon Maimon: An Autobiography, trans. J. Clark Murray 
(London: Gardener, 1888), p. 113.
55 Cf. Beiser, German Idealism, p. 353.
56 Deleuze, ‘The Method of Dramatization’, p. 101. See also Difference and Repetition, 
p. 208.
57 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 222.
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becomes a genuine plane of immanence that reintroduces Spinozism 
into the heart of the philosophical process.’58 The plane of immanence 
is ‘absolute immanence’,59 which is not in something; it is not immanent 
to anything other than itself, neither to a self-consciousness or tran-
scendental subject, nor to an object. Rather, subjects and objects evolve 
from the plane of immanence; they are ontologically secondary. As the 
title of the essay already announces, Deleuze equates the plane of imma-
nence with ‘a life’, an indeterminate and inorganic life, which is not yet 
individualised.
We will say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and nothing else. . . . A 
life is the immanence of immanence, absolute immanence: it is complete 
power, complete bliss. It is to the degree that he goes beyond the aporias 
of the subject and the object that Johann Fichte, in his last philosophy, 
presents the transcendental field as a life, no longer dependent on a Being 
or submitted to an Act – it is an absolute immediate consciousness whose 
very activity no longer refers to a being but is ceaselessly posed in a life.60
Here Deleuze refers to Fichte’s late philosophy of his Second Introduction 
to the Science of Knowledge (1797), in which Fichte seems to rethink 
and redefine the starting point of transcendental philosophy. While 
in his Jena years he held that the principle of all philosophy lies in an 
original and reflective act (Tathandlung) of self-consciousness – i.e. in a 
free and self-positing ‘I’ – he later did not hesitate to evoke an ‘Absolute’ 
(Absolute Being or God) or ‘a life’, thereby abandoning the analysis of 
the self as a philosophical starting point. His new ‘Doctrine of Being, 
Life and Blessedness’61 clearly approaches speculative philosophy: ‘It is 
the living and efficient Ex-istence of the Absolute itself which alone has 
power to be and to exist, and beside which nothing is, nor truly exists.’62 
This absolute Being, ‘which in itself and in God is pure activity and 
Life’,63 can only be and exist through itself. Like Spinoza’s substance, it 
is an unconditioned, self-grounding principle or sufficient reason. Fichte, 
just like the young Romantics and Schelling had done long before him, 
vitalised Spinoza’s concept of substance: the Absolute becomes alive and 
58 Gilles Deleuze, ‘Immanence: A Life’, in Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life, trans. 
Anne Boyman (New York: Zone Books, 2001), pp. 27–8.
59 Ibid. p. 26.
60 Ibid. p. 27.
61 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, The Way towards the Blessed Life; or The Doctrine of 
Religion, trans. William Smith (London: Chapman, 1849), p. 190, available online at 
<https://archive.org/stream/waytowardsbless00fichgoog#page/n6/mode/2up>.
62 Ibid. p. 54.
63 Ibid. p. 78.
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dynamic.64 The pressing question then became: How can the Absolute, 
which is necessarily lasting, without beginning and end, be ‘formed and 
moulded into a particular World, and indeed into an infinitely varied 
World, flowing onward in a never-ending stream of new and changing 
forms’?65 The conception of the organism served as a powerful model 
for the development of the Absolute. Hölderlin, Novalis, Schlegel, 
Schelling and (last but not least) Hegel all formulated the idea of dialec-
tical development, which they found characteristic of all organic things: 
‘it begins from a stage of inchoate unity; it then differentiates itself; and 
it then reintegrates itself, so that its development consists in the stages of 
unity, difference, and unity-in-difference’.66
Although the ideas of self-differentiation, difference and differentials 
were of fundamental importance in the post-Kantian tradition, the 
concept of difference still remained subordinated to identity, organic 
unity, or totality. Deleuze compares Leibniz and Hegel, stating that they 
both pursued the thought of difference – the former as infinitely small 
differences, the latter as contradiction, the opposite extreme limit of dif-
ference. They therefore both entertained a model of ‘infinite representa-
tion’. However, the problem with infinite representation, according to 
Deleuze, is that
it does not free itself from the principle of identity as a presupposition of 
representation. . . . Infinite representation invokes a foundation. While this 
foundation is not the identical itself, it is nevertheless a way of taking the 
principle of identity particularly seriously, giving it an infinite value and 
rendering it coextensive with the whole, and in this manner allowing it to 
reign over existence itself.67
Deleuze, by contrast, ascribes primacy to the concept of difference. 
Difference must receive its own concept, such that it is no longer nega-
tively defined as a lack of identity. It must free itself from a primary 
unity. When Deleuze repudiates the concept of foundation, what he 
aims to prevent is the sublation or reconciliation of difference in a higher 
identity of ‘identity and difference’. It does not mean, however, that 
he completely abandons the idea of foundation. Rather, in Difference 
and Repetition, he modifies the idea and elaborates an account of ‘a 
universal ungrounding’ or ‘groundlessness’,68 which tries to elude the 
64 Cf. Beiser, German Idealism, p. 367.
65 Fichte, The Way towards the Blessed Life, p. 79.
66 Beiser, German Idealism, p. 367.
67 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 49.
68 Ibid. p. 91.
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trap of identity, unity or totality, and along with it, the mystical idea of 
a universal organism or rational plan, a purposiveness or teleology in 
nature. In this sense, he keeps closer to Spinoza and his banishment of 
final causes. However, besides difference, the second most fundamental 
‘transcendental principle’, or condition of genesis, for Deleuze, is repeti-
tion. Repetition, production and reproduction are the major functions 
of the faculty of imagination, which for the German Romantics becomes 
a constitutive faculty of central importance. As Deleuze writes in his 
early lecture course Qu’est-ce que fonder?, after he has talked about 
the post-Kantian account of genesis and in particular about Novalis’ 
 philosophy of the imagination:
What is unveiled (in the last chapter) is the true structure of the imagina-
tion, that is its meaning which can only be understood through the enter-
prise of grounding, which far from supposing the point of view of the 
infinite, is nothing other than the principle of the imagination.69
The faculty of imagination not only produces images; it also corresponds 
to a movement of reproduction in nature. It thus acts as a constitutive 
principle, that is a real movement of things themselves or a pure dyna-
mism in nature. For the German Romantics, therefore, the boundary 
between philosophy and art, especially poetry, becomes blurred.
AESTHETICS
In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant ranks the faculty of the imagina-
tion among the lower cognitive faculties and ascribes to it a mediating 
role. Its task is the synthesis of reproduction, which remains subject to 
the determining, a priori concepts of the understanding. It is only in his 
third Critique that Kant allows a certain ‘free play’ of the imagination. 
The faculty of the imagination reflects the aesthetic form of the beautiful 
object and, beyond that, exercises a spontaneous and inventive produc-
tion of images, entirely unrestrained by determining concepts. In fact, 
it cannot be taken merely ‘as reproductive, as subjected to the laws of 
association, but as productive and self-active (as the authoress of vol-
untary forms of possible intuitions)’.70 By way of example, Kant refers 
to English landscape gardens or baroque furniture whose extravagant 
69 Cf. Deleuze, Qu’est-ce que fonder?, trans. Daniela Voss.
70 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul 
Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 5: 240. 
(The pagination corresponds to the standard German edition of Kant’s works, Kant’s 
Gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences.)
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variety of forms ‘pushes the freedom of the imagination almost to the 
point of the grotesque’.71 Likewise, in natural instances such as ‘the 
changing shapes of a fire in a hearth or of a rippling brook’ imagination 
sustains its free play.72 In the Kantian theory of the sublime, the faculty 
of the imagination also plays a crucial role, because its failure to rep-
resent the infinite (the mathematically sublime) or its powerlessness in 
view of violent natural forces (the dynamically sublime) gives us, in the 
last resort, the feeling of something supernatural: Ideas of reason. This is 
to say that the imagination makes us aware of the superiority of reason 
and its regulative Ideas. Although it can never fully represent rational 
Ideas and therefore remains in stark contrast to reason, it attains a 
certain harmony with the higher cognitive faculties, because it acts 
in agreement with the moral interest of reason: it strives to incarnate 
rational Ideas in sensible nature by creating aesthetic Ideas.
Kant’s reflections on beautiful objects in art and nature, as well as on 
the sublime, certify a certain Kantian ‘Romanticism’. As Deleuze says: 
in his aesthetic of the Beautiful and of the Sublime, Kant gives access to 
a realm ‘in which the sensible is valid in itself and unfolds in a pathos 
beyond all logic’.73 The German Romantics were looking for just that: 
a form of knowledge which is nonconceptual and indemonstrable, but 
which we know to be true through direct experience. They found it in 
immediate aesthetic intuition, thereby ascribing enormous power to the 
imagination. What they had done was to transfer the traditional concept 
of intellectual intuition as an exercise of the infinite intellect into the aes-
thetic sphere. The Romantics claimed that we could know the absolute 
through aesthetic experience. Poetry, painting and music became the 
province of the ineffable, i.e. that which is inexpressible in words from 
the point of view of logic. The same goes for our ordinary sense percep-
tion: our sensuous experience of colours, sounds and tastes also cannot 
be verbalised adequately or proved by means of formal logical inference. 
Nature as a whole was considered as a work of art and as the expression 
of the absolute or infinite. Thus, Schlegel said in his lectures on tran-
scendental philosophy: ‘Idealism regards nature as a work of art, as a 
poem.’74 The German Romantics no longer separated aesthetics as rigor-
71 Ibid. 5: 242.
72 Ibid. 5: 244.
73 Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties, trans. Hugh 
Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London: Continuum, 2008), p. xi.
74 Friedrich Schlegel, Vorlesungen über Transcendentalphilosophie, in Ernst Behler, Jean-
Jacques Anstett and Hans Eichner (eds), Kritische Friedrich Schlegel Ausgabe (Paderborn: 
Ferdinand Schöningh, 1958–), vol. XII, p. 105 (translation by Daniela Voss).
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ously as Kant had done into a doctrine of objective sense experience on 
the one hand, and on the other a theory of the beautiful and the sublime. 
Kant’s critical claims about the limitation of our cognitive powers were 
put into question by reintroducing a sort of intellectual intuition, a trans-
cendent exercise of the imagination. As Deleuze says, Kant’s theory of the 
free and unregulated play of imagination paved the way for Romanticism 
and, against his intention, became its ‘foundation’.75
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze himself develops a theory of the 
transcendent exercise [exercice transcendant] of the faculties, accord-
ing to which each faculty is unhinged and ceases to collaborate with 
the other faculties in ‘common sense’. That is to say, the faculties no 
longer converge with the aim of recognising one and the same object, 
which can be sensed, recalled, imagined or conceived. Rather they are 
confronted with something that is not communicable within the context 
of a common sense: the ‘imperceptible’ or ‘the being of the sensible’.76 
This something, according to Deleuze, ‘moves the soul, “perplexes” 
it – in other words, forces it to pose a problem: as though the object of 
encounter, the sign, were the bearer of a problem’.77 What impinges on 
the senses and forces their transcendent exercise, is a transcendental Idea 
or problem. In this sense, Deleuze agrees with the post-Kantian Idealists 
who ‘insist that their ideas play the same transcendental role as the 
categories: they too are necessary conditions of possible experience’.78 
Or, more precisely, they are genetic conditions of real experience and 
of thought.
Deleuze’s dialectic of Ideas combines the two halves of the aesthetic 
treated separately by Kant: differential or intensive Ideas serve at the 
same time as genetic conditions of experience and of the production of 
the work of art.79 As Deleuze explicates in his book on Francis Bacon, 
the challenge of a work of art is to capture the invisible, intensive forces 
– that by which the sensible is given, or the condition of sensation.80 
In aesthetic experience, we are encouraged to an activity of thought 
beyond empirical representation, i.e. an exploration of the transcenden-
tal domain of sensibility. In spite of the obvious parallels to German 
Romanticism, there are considerable differences. The Romantics, for 
75 Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, p. xi.
76 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 140.
77 Ibid.
78 Beiser, German Idealism, p. 166.
79 See Daniel Smith, ‘Deleuze, Kant and the Transcendental Field’, in this volume, p. ???
80 Cf. Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith 
(London: Continuum, 2004), pp. 56–7.
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instance, claim that aesthetic contemplation reveals purposiveness, 
rationality and values that are intrinsic to nature itself; they took the 
second part of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment on teleological 
judgement in a metaphysical sense and introduced a form of teleology 
into the natural order. Of course, from a postmodern point of view 
the presupposition of an inherent harmony or beauty, rationality or 
purposiveness in nature is not tenable. For Deleuze, the transcenden-
tal field is rather a violent ‘chaosmos’ that forces transformations and 
metamorphoses, which can only be sustained by larval subjects at the 
border of the liveable: ‘it would entail the death of any well-constituted 
subject endowed with independence and activity’.81 Thus, Deleuze 
does not outline a theory of aesthetic contemplation but rather one of 
violent encounter. Moreover, it is not the Absolute which reveals itself: 
Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism eschews any reassuring transcend-
ence and totality. It is not a speculative idealism of the Absolute, but a 
philosophy of immanence: the immanence of a multiplicity of transcen-
dental, differential and problematic Ideas.
OUTLINE OF THE VOLUME
The contributions of this volume are divided into three parts. Part I 
focuses directly on the engagement between Deleuze and Kant’s philoso-
phy, with particular emphasis on Maimon’s intermediary role. Part II 
explores Deleuze’s relation to key thinkers and concepts in post-Kantian 
Romanticism and Idealism, while the final part of this collection pursues 
various lines of post-Kantian thought and the manner in which they 
transverse and are augmented by Deleuze.
Part I: Deleuze, Kant and Maimon
For the volume’s opening chapter, ‘Deleuze, Kant and the Transcendental 
Field’, Daniel W. Smith explores the way in which Deleuze takes up yet 
inverts the Kantian critical project by rethinking Kant’s definition of the 
transcendental. Deleuze’s major source of inspiration, Smith argues, is 
Salomon Maimon’s account of differentials, which was not pursued as 
such by post-Kantian philosophy. This Deleuzian-Maimonian redefini-
tion of the transcendental condition has significant effects in each of 
the five domains that structure the critical project: dialectics, aesthetics, 
analytics, politics and ethics.
81 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 118.
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In Chapter 2, Anne Sauvagnargues investigates the different sources 
that inspired Deleuze’s account of ‘transcendental empiricism’, focusing 
on Maimon and his central role in the critique of the Kantian method 
of conditioning and the invention of a method of genesis. Deleuze 
appropriates Maimon’s theory of differentials or Ideas, while aban-
doning the transcendental idealism of the divine understanding. But as 
Sauvagnargues shows, Deleuze alters the definition of Ideas through an 
engagement with structuralism, as well as the works of Albert Lautman 
and Gilbert Simondon, giving rise to the definition of Ideas as virtual 
and differentiated structures that solicit the creation of concepts through 
processes of differenciation.
In her chapter ‘Maimon, Kant, Deleuze: The Concepts of Difference 
and Intensive Magnitude’, Daniela Voss analyses Maimon’s account 
of difference and identity as the transcendental conditions of percep-
tion in general. Following a historical-critical and exegetical analysis, 
Voss discusses the questions of the nature of difference as differential 
and intensive magnitudes, as well as its precise status as a regulative or 
constitutive principle. While the post-Kantian philosophers still ascribed 
primacy to the principle of identity, Deleuze embraces Maimon’s chal-
lenge and renders the notion of difference the fundamental principle of 
his own transcendental philosophy.
Rounding off the opening section of the Volume, Beth Lord’s contri-
bution, ‘Deleuze and Kant’s Critique of Judgment’, critically examines 
Deleuze’s reading of Kant’s third Critique and his emphasis on the free 
accord of the faculties as a presupposition of the genesis of thought. 
What is completely missing in Deleuze’s seemingly psychological and 
romantic account of the faculties, Lord suggests, is the political dimen-
sion of the Critique of Judgment, which Hannah Arendt has famously 
pointed out in her 1970 Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy. Lord 
juxtaposes both readings and thereby elucidates Deleuze’s particular 
interest that guided his interpretation of Kant.
Part II: Deleuze, Romanticism and Idealism
Heinrich von Kleist experienced Kantian philosophy as a crisis in his life 
and thought. As a response, Brent Adkins argues, Kleist created a liter-
ary ‘war machine’ against Kant’s statist image of thought, which sub-
ordinates thought to the interiority of the concept. For Kleist, thought 
must be opened to an outside – to external forces – only then can it 
produce something new. In his stories and plays he puts this idea into 
practice. As Adkins shows in his chapter ‘What is a Literature of War?: 
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Kleist, Kant and Nomadology’, both Kleist and Deleuze turn to affects 
in an attempt to deterritorialise Kant’s philosophy.
In Chapter 6 ‘The Calculable Law of Tragic Representation and the 
Unthinkable: Rhythm, Caesura and Time, from Hölderlin to Deleuze’, 
Arkady Plotnitsky presents a rich investigation of Friedrich Hölderlin’s 
place within Deleuze’s scholarship, moving across the fields of science, 
art and philosophy. Plotnitsky’s aim is to explore Hölderlin’s concept 
of rhythm, as it is developed in his analysis of ancient Greek tragedy, 
and to outline its major philosophical contribution: the invention of a 
nonclassical, Romantic ontology. This ontology, Plotnitsky says, is con-
cerned with the unthinkable – that which is beyond the reach of thought 
and cannot be captured by classical ontological concepts. The unthink-
able is the ultimate efficacy of all rhythmic effects and counter-rhythmic 
movements on the level of actual events. It also bears important links, 
Plotnitsky elaborates, with Deleuze’s concept of chaos as the virtual.
While Deleuze rarely comments directly on Johann Gottlieb Fichte, a 
connection between both can nevertheless be established when reading 
Fichte’s own texts. In his chapter, ‘Ground, Transcendence and Method 
in Deleuze’s Fichte’, Joe Hughes shows how, outlining several paral-
lel structures that emerge with regard to their respective methods and 
conceptions. Specifically, Hughes elicits and examines the resonances 
between their conceptions of subjectivity, transcendence and real expe-
rience, and he further points out the affinities between their methods of 
genesis and the absolute positing of a self-grounding principle. What he 
shows is that both engage with a common problem: the completion of 
the Kantian project.
Continuing the volume’s exploration of Deleuze and Fichte, Frederick 
Amrine’s chapter ‘“The magic formula we all seek”: Spinoza + Fichte 
= x’, reintroduces the figure of Spinoza to the equation, elucidating the 
thematic connections in all three thinkers. Several points of conver-
gence are identified, including the ontology of expression, the priority 
of imagination, the privileging of intuition over discursive thinking or 
logic, self-positing concepts and the conception of a pure life. Amrine 
concludes that those three thinkers ‘are deeply connected by a Deleuzian 
rhizome stretching across four centuries’.82
In Chapter 9, ‘State Philosophy and the War Machine’, Nathan 
Widder undertakes a fresh analysis of Hegel’s political philosophy with 
respect to Deleuze and Guattari. As he reveals, beyond the common 
presumption of Deleuze’s anti-Hegelianism lies a complex and subtle set 
82 Amrine, ‘“The magic formula we all seek”: Spinoza + Fichte = x’, in this volume, p. ???
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of connections – including, Widder claims, a shared understanding of 
political structure as an assemblage of desire. In explicating a series of 
affinities as well as departures, Widder ultimately argues that the rela-
tion between Hegel and Deleuze and Guattari is best described as one of 
a ‘disjunctive synthesis’.
Sean Bowden’s chapter, ‘Tragedy and Agency in Hegel and Deleuze’, 
sheds light on Deleuze’s largely implicit account of action and agency 
in The Logic of Sense and compares it with Hegel’s view, as interpreted 
by thinkers such as Speight, Brandom and Pippin. It argues that both 
Hegel and Deleuze share an expressivist understanding of action and 
agency, which comes to the fore in their respective interpretations of 
Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex. The account of expressivist action and agency 
is summarised in three structural features: retrospectivity, publicness 
and heroism.
Part III: Deleuzian Lines of Post-Kantian Thought
The final part of this collection, which embarks on a number of post-
Kantian adventures under the guidance of Deleuze, begins with Alistair 
Welchman’s piece ‘Schopenhauer and Deleuze’. It could be noted that 
Deleuze’s engagement with Schopenhauer is rather limited and argu-
ably encapsulated by his criticism of the ascetic and pessimistic tone 
of Schopenhauerian philosophy. But as Welchman provocatively sug-
gests, Deleuze’s rejection is premature; indeed, Schopenhauer’s break 
with Kant, along with his critique of representation, could be said to 
have much in common with Deleuze’s own post-Kantian project. For 
instance, both of them pose the question of what lies beyond represen-
tational experience. Furthermore, Schopenhauer’s metaphysical concep-
tion of the will, Welchman argues, traverses Deleuze and Guattari’s 
Anti-Oedipus and opens the space for the Deleuzo-Guattarian notion of 
a transcendental, impersonal and productive unconscious.
Taking up the problem of ‘beginnings’ in philosophy and the nature 
of philosophical critique, Henry Somers-Hall’s chapter ‘Feuerbach 
and the Image of Thought’ carries out an appraisal and comparison of 
Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel with Deleuze’s criticism of the ‘dogmatic 
image of thought’ – the chapter of Difference and Repetition nominated 
by Deleuze as his most important and enduring.83 What Somers-Hall 
finds is a striking resemblance between the two. In the closing passages 
of his chapter, however, Somers-Hall also isolates a key moment of 
83 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. xvii.
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divergence in their conception of the ‘encounter’ – that which provides 
the opening onto truly philosophical thought.
In Chapter 13, ‘Deleuze’s “Power of Decision”, Kant’s =X and 
Husserl’s Noema’, Jay Lampert analyses the nature and time-structure 
of decisions. Following a consideration of the Kantian object=X, 
the Fichtean-Hegelian-Husserlian understanding of ‘=’, and Deleuze’s 
account of decision as a divergence-point of incompossible timelines, 
Lampert arrives at what could be referred to as an ethical account of a 
‘decision=X’. In doing so, the following challenge is advanced: What is 
our relation to decisions made in the past, and the multiple paths that 
appear to stem from them? In what sense have we lived them all, or not?
In the penultimate chapter of the collection, Gregg Lambert explores 
the family history of contemporary French philosophy, analysing in 
particular the kinship between Kant and two of his bastard children – 
Deleuze and Lyotard. As Lambert puts it, these two thinkers are ‘pure 
bastards’, insofar as they refuse much of their philosophical inheritance 
and similarly nurture an ambivalent relation to the vogue of Hegelianism 
and twentieth-century phenomenology. In order to explain, Lambert 
zeros in on Deleuze and Lyotard’s peculiar breed of Kantianism, and 
in particular their engagement with Kant’s third Critique. From this he 
shows how Deleuze and Lyotard succeed in reworking Kantianism, and 
further how the culture of modernist art produces the conditions for a 
new understanding of the Kantian sublime.
Finally, Gregory Flaxman’s chapter ‘Chronos is Sick: Deleuze, 
Antonioni and the Kantian Lineage of Modern Cinema’, explores the 
way in which modern European cinema repeats, on its own terms and 
under its own conditions, the ‘revolution’ that took place in philosophy 
through Kant’s concept of the pure and empty form of time. By way of 
Hölderlin’s conception of time, which according to Deleuze elaborates 
Kantian time on the level of Greek tragedy, Flaxman outlines three 
figures of time and traces them in Antonioni’s mature works of the 
1960s and 70s. As Flaxman argues, Antonioni realises the three figures 
in the expression of three types of time-image.
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